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Abstract 
 
Neuroscience research is undergoing a minor revolution. Recent advances in machine learning 
and artificial intelligence (AI) research have opened up new ways of thinking about neural 
computation. Many researchers are excited by the possibility that deep neural networks may 
offer theories of perception, cognition and action for biological brains. This perspective has the 
potential to radically reshape our approach to understanding neural systems, because the 
computations performed by deep networks are learned from experience, not endowed by the 
researcher. If so, how can neuroscientists use deep networks to model and understand 
biological brains? What is the outlook for neuroscientists who seek to characterise 
computations or neural codes, or who wish to understand perception, attention, memory, and 
executive functions? In this Perspective, our goal is to offer a roadmap for systems 
neuroscience research in the age of deep learning. We discuss the conceptual and 
methodological challenges of comparing behaviour, learning dynamics, and neural 
representation in artificial and biological systems. We highlight new research questions that 
have emerged for neuroscience as a direct consequence of recent advances in machine 
learning. 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have seen a dramatic resurgence in optimism about the progress of AI research, 
driven by advances in deep learning1. Deep learning is the name given to a methodological 
toolkit for building multi-layer (or deep) neural networks that can solve challenging problems 
in supervised classification2, generative modelling3, or reinforcement learning4,5. Neuroscience 
and AI research have a rich shared history6, and deep networks are now increasingly being 
considered as promising theories of neural computation. The recent literature is studded with 
comparisons of behaviour and brain activity in biological and artificial systems7-21, summarised 
in a growing number of review articles22-30. In this Perspective, we assess the opportunities and 
challenges presented by this new wave of intellectual synergy between neuroscience and AI 
research.  
 
2. Neoconnectionism? 
 
The idea that neural networks can serve as theories of neural computation is not new. During 
the parallel distributed processing (PDP) movement of the 1980s, psychologists and computer 
scientists proposed neural networks as solutions to key problems in perception, memory and 
language31. Contemporary deep networks resemble scaled-up connectionist models, and 
recent advances in machine learning are also heavily indebted to the ubiquity of digital data 
and the relatively low cost of computation in the 21st century26. It might thus be tempting to 
dismiss current excitement around deep learning models for neuroscience as a rehashing of 
earlier ideas, owing more to slow churn of scientific fashion than to genuine intellectual 
progress. However, many researchers believe that deep learning models have the potential to 
radically reshape neural theory, and to open new avenues for symbiotic research between 
neuroscience and AI research23,32-34. This is because contemporary deep networks are different 
from their connectionist ancestors in a crucial way: their learning is grounded in quasi-
naturalistic sensory signals, such as image pixels13 or auditory spectrograms15, rather than their 
input and output units being hand-labelled by the researcher. Contemporary deep networks 
can thus learn ‘end-to-end’ in a sensory ecology that resembles our own: natural sounds and 
scenes for supervised learning and generative modelling, and 3d environments with realistic 
physics for deep reinforcement learning. This advent of end-to-end models of biological 
function has allowed researchers to attempt to model, for the first time, the de novo 
emergence of neural computations that are capable of solving real-world problems. 
 
One major line of research has examined the representations formed by supervised deep 
networks that are trained to label objects in natural scenes2 (Fig. 1). A striking observation is 
that biologically plausible neural representations can emerge in networks that combine 
gradient descent with a handful of simple computational principles29. When deep networks 
are endowed with local receptivity, convolutions, pooling and normalisation, the early layers 
acquire simple filters for orientation and spatial frequency2, just like neurons in area V1; 
whereas in deeper layers, the distributions and similarity structure of neural representations 
for objects and categories resemble those in the primate ventral stream12-14,19. 
Representational equivalence may be stronger in more accurate networks13, and network 
activations even can be harnessed for novel image synthesis, allowing causal assays of the 
predictive links between artificial and biological networks35,36. One corollary of these findings 
is that the sophisticated behaviours and structured neural representations observed in humans 
and other animals might emerge from a limited set of computational principles, as long as the 
input data are sufficiently rich, and the network is appropriately optimised25,37. 
 
3. Deep learning as a framework for neural computation 
 
This claim has potentially profound implications for neuroscience. It has already prompted calls 
for systems neuroscientists to refrain from building theories that impose intuitive functional 
significance on neural circuits by fiat, and instead to study the computations that emerge 
spontaneously during the training of deep networks23,32-34. This so-called deep learning 
framework bypasses the handcrafting in classical neuroscience, where for example constraints 
are placed on neural encoding by assuming a shape for tuning curves, or population dynamics 
are explicitly engineered via the wiring diagram of excitatory and inhibitory neurons. Instead, 
the role of the researchers is now principally to specify the overall architecture, the learning 
rule and the cost function; control is relinquished over the microstructure of computation, 
which instead emerges organically over the course of training33. An extension of this argument 
draws an analogy between optimisation over computation in neural networks, and over 
biological forms by evolution: in both cases, interpretable functional adaptations emerge 
without meaningful constraints being imposed on the search process32. In other words, it is 
claimed that neural systems are fundamentally uninterpretable, and structured theories of 
perception and cognition are “just so stories” that reflect more closely the researcher’s quest 
for meaning than the reality of neural computation32. 
 
One appealing aspect of the deep learning framework is that it relieves researchers of the 
burden of exhaustively documenting and interpreting the coding properties of single neurons. 
As methodological advances have permitted simultaneous recordings from large numbers of 
neurons38, a doctrine has emerged by which neural representation is dynamically multiplexed 
across populations39. From this perspective, single neurons code for multiple experimental 
variables and their interactions40-43, exhibiting the nonlinear, mixed selectivity that is also a 
hallmark of units in deep networks44. This tendency seems to be most pronounced in higher 
cortical areas, such as the parietal and prefrontal cortex, that support working memory and 
action selection40-42. In these regions, the coding properties of single neurons can be highly 
heterogenous and vary in mystifying ways over the course of a given trial40,41,45. However, 
when neural activity is examined at the population level, for example by using dimensionality 
reduction, neural patterns emerge that meaningfully distinguish experimental variables46,47.  
 
Another key observation is that these patterns of population activity can be recreated when 
the same analysis is applied to unit activations in recurrent neural networks trained to evaluate 
time-varying decision evidence46-48, judge the length of a time interval49,50, or maintain 
information over a delay period51-53. Accordingly, a major theoretical perspective is emerging 
that proposes deep recurrent neural networks as computational theories for sensorimotor 
integration and working memory processes. In the domain of working memory, a particularly 
interesting new line of research has used recurrent networks to ask when codes for stored 
information should be static or dynamic, addressing a key question in systems neuroscience53. 
This work has contributed to claims that it is futile to characterise the coding properties of 
individual cells or infer how they participate in computation40. Instead, it is argued, the 
computational model is only explainable at the aggregate level of the population, which is 
ultimately driven by the structure of the network and the way it is optimised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Limitations of the deep learning framework 
 
The deep learning framework proposes powerful new tools for modelling the bewildering 
volumes of data that are now routinely recorded in systems neuroscience labs. However, we 
hope that enthusiasm for deep networks as computational models will be tempered with a 
sober consideration of how they can be usefully deployed to understand neural mechanism 
Figure 1. Representational equivalence between neural networks and the primate brain. A. Left: schematic 
illustration of simple and complex cell receptive fields from mammalian V1. Right: example filters learned 
in the first hidden layer of a deep convolutional neural network. [REF 2] B. Example representational 
similarity matrices illustrating the similarity in population activity evoked by objects in early visual areas of 
the primate brain (recorded with electrophysiology) and in the intermediate layers in a deep convolutional 
neural network.  [REF 14] C.  Schematic neural firing rates in response to a series of natural images (black 
trace; examples above) and activity predicted as a linear transform of neural network activity (red trace). 
[REF 13] D. Representational similarity matrices as in B except comparing inferior temporal (IT) cortex with 
the final layers of a convolutional neural network. [REF 14]. E. Schematic showing relationship between 
variance explained in IT signals and classification accuracy for pseudo-randomly generated neural 
networks that are trained either to maximise classification performance (blue dots) or variance explained 
in neural signals (yellow dots) [REF 13]. F. Left: state space analysis of neural signals from macaque area 
LIP recorded during a dot motion categorisation task. Red and blue lines show different motion directions 
belonging to opposing categories, trajectories are plotted in two dimensions. Right: same analysis 
conducted on hidden units of a recurrent neural network [REF 47]. G. Left: state space analysis performed 
on neural signals recorded from macaque dorsomedial prefrontal cortex during performance of fast or 
slow interval reproduction task, plotted in three dimensions. Right: same analysis conducted on hidden 
units of a recurrent neural network [REF 50]. 
 
and cognitive function. In other words, if deep learning is the answer – then what are the 
questions that neuroscientists should ultimately be asking? 
 
Unfortunately, as currently articulated, the deep learning framework offers only the scantiest 
roadmap for neuroscience research23,32-34. If neural computation emerges uncontrollably 
through blind, unconstrained optimisation, then how can neuroscientists formulate new, 
empirically testable hypotheses about neural mechanism? Such hypotheses are argued to take 
the form of design choices about learning rules, regularisation principles, or architectural 
constraints in deep networks33. There is some evidence that more judicious design choices for 
deep networks may permit a closer match to biology29. For example, adding recurrent 
connections improves the fit to neural data18, especially for more challenging natural images, 
and at later post-stimulus time points17, whereas including a biologically plausible front end (a 
‘retina net’) encourages the formation of realistic coding properties, including cell types 
typically found in the thalamus54. In general, however, we lack overall guiding principles for 
making such design choices. In machine learning research, networks are rarely built with 
biological plausibility in mind, and so there is relatively little prior guidance in how they might 
be used to model neural systems. Moreover, understanding the mapping from design to 
performance in deep networks is challenging, which is presumably why AI has a relatively poor 
track record in conducting interpretable or overtly hypothesis-driven research, preferring to 
focus instead on whether the system works rather than why it works55.  
 
At worst, the deep learning framework seems to broadside neuroscience with an existential 
threat. The novel research programme asks researchers to document how different 
architectures or algorithms can encourage deep networks to form semantically meaningful 
representations or exhibit complex behaviours, like humans and other animals. This endeavour 
sounds suspiciously similar to contemporary AI research itself. As such, the project does not 
seem to build upon the comprehensive understanding of neural computation that has been 
furnished by decades of research into biological brains. Rather, it seems to propose sweeping 
this knowledge away, merging the goals of theoretical neuroscience with those of 
contemporary AI research.  
 
5. Are deep networks promising theories of object recognition? 
 
The deep learning framework is built upon the proposal that neural networks learn 
representations and computations that resemble those in biological brains. However, it is 
possible that the equivalence between deep networks and animal brains has been 
overstated22. Indeed, comparing the multivariate representations in brains and neural models 
is fraught with statistical challenges56. Currently, one popular approach is to learn a linear 
mapping from neurons to network units, and to evaluate the predictive validity of the resulting 
regression model in a held-out dataset. Adopting this approach for image classification, the 
highest-performing deep networks can explain an impressive 60% of the variance in neuronal 
responses in primate area IT. However, neural networks that perform substantially worse at 
image classification explain just 5% less57. Indeed, directly comparing predictive accuracy (on 
BOLD signals) for trained and untrained (initialised to random) networks, the difference is quite 
small – on the order of 5-10% accuracy difference for most visual regions19. It is often forgotten 
that landmark studies on which claims of representational equivalence are based actually used 
untrained deep networks13. 
 
Testing whether neural signals are an affine transform of model activations is a good start, but 
such a relationship could exist even if the neural patterns differ wildly in terms of sparsity or 
dimensionality. Stricter tests of shared coding are provided by methods that restrict the 
freedom of the mapping function, such as representational similarity analysis (RSA)58. RSA 
discloses a superficial resemblance between brains and networks but it is hard to tell whether 
this agreement is driven principally by stimuli that are physically similar, such as faces, and the 
differing patterns evoked by animate vs. inanimate objects14. An important goal for future 
research, thus is going to be to more rigorously assess the status of the claim that deep 
networks and biological brains learn equivalent neural codes. 
 
Another way to test the equivalence between biological and artificial systems is to study their 
behaviour, i.e. to examine how their response patterns evolve over the course of training, and 
how they can be experimentally manipulated. This is vital because the computations in a neural 
system can only be understood in the context of the behaviour they produce59. Revealingly, 
humans and machines make sharply different sorts of errors in assays of object recognition. In 
one study, networks were prone to confuse object classes that humans and even monkeys 
could safely tell apart, such as dogs and guitars, and patterns of confusion among individual 
images were shared by humans and macaques, but not deep networks11. Similarly, humans 
generalise far better than deep networks to images that have been perturbed by adding 
pixelated noise, or bandpass filtering9, and are less prone to be fooled by deliberately 
misleading images7,21,22. There is a widespread view that biological vision exhibits a robustness 
that is currently lacking in supervised deep neural networks.  
 
More generally, animal behaviour is richly structured, in theory permitting researchers to make 
systematic comparisons with machine performance60. For example, animal decisions are 
subject to stereotyped biases, but also irreducibly noisy61; animals are flexible but forgetful, 
behaving as if memory and control systems were capacity limited62, and the rate and 
effectiveness of information acquisition depends strongly on the structure and ordering of the 
study materials63. Mature theories of biological brain function should be able account for these 
phenomena, and we hope that future deep network models will be held to this standard. 
 
6. Theory and understanding of deep learning models 
The computations performed by deep networks are enmeshed in millions of trainable 
parameters. It is not surprising, thus, that they have been dubbed “black boxes”. Despite this 
complexity, in neural networks we can access every synaptic weight and unit activation over 
the course of learning, a feat that remains impossible in animal models. These considerations 
raise thorny questions concerning the utility of deep networks as neural models, and more 
generally, raise the question of what it means to “understand” a neural process via a 
computational model34. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus far, neuroscientists have preferred to employ off-the-shelf deep convolutional networks 
as neural models29. However, collaborations between theoretical neuroscientists, physicists 
and computer scientists have paved the way for a new approach that uses idealised neural 
network models to understand the mathematical principles by which they learn64, and deploys 
the results to predict or explain phenomena in psychology or neuroscience65. For this 
endeavour to be tractable, deep network models must be simplified, for example by employing 
linear activation functions (“deep linear” networks)66, structured environments67,68, or by 
studying limit cases, such the limits of infinite width or depth, the high-dimensional limit69,70, 
or the shallow limit64 (Fig. 2). Paradoxically, these infinite-size networks are often more 
interpretable than those with fewer units, because their learning trajectory is more stable and 
not prone to be waylaid by bad local minima68,69,71. Some network idealisations have offered 
exact solutions for the learning trajectories that every single synapse will follow72-74, and 
Figure 2. Understanding deep networks using idealized models. A-B. By simplifying the neural nonlinearity, 
deep linear networks permit exact solutions to training error dynamics (A) and weight dynamics (B) for 
certain initializations [REF 65]. Full simulations from small random weights track these dynamics closely. 
C. Training speed in deep linear networks depends on initialization. Small random weights scale 
exponentially in depth, unsupervised pretraining scales linearly, and orthogonal initializations are depth-
independent. D. Training error of nonlinear networks of different sizes trained on the XOR binary 
classification task. Networks with few hidden units exhibit complex trajectories, often ending at nonzero 
error. Large networks reliably find a solution and take similar trajectories. This trajectory can be described 
analytically in the infinite width limit under a particular initialization regime [REF 73-74]. E. Analytical 
training and testing dynamics for a ‘student’ network learning from a ‘teacher’ network, permitting 
analysis of generalization performance on novel examples and the overtraining phenomenon [REF 67-69]. 
F. Analytical predictions for the generalization error after extensive training in the high-dimensional 
regime where data is scarce relative to the number of weights. Generalization error peaks at the transition 
from over- to under-parameterization [REF 69-70]. 
 
answered perplexing questions about network behaviour: for example, why learning often 
involves transitions between quasi-discrete stages, why deep networks are often slower to 
train, or why an initial epoch of layer by layer statistical learning (“unsupervised pretraining”) 
can accelerate future learning with gradient descent. This work questions the notion that deep 
neural networks are “black boxes” and promises interpretable neural network models of 
biological phenomena (Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Developmental trajectories in deep linear neural networks.  A. An idealized hierarchical 
environment. Items (leaf nodes) possess many properties like “can fly” or “has roots.” Nearby items in 
the tree are more likely to share properties. B. Schematic 2D embedding of internal representations for 
each item over learning in a deep linear network trained to output each item’s properties. The network 
passes through a series of stages in which higher hierarchical distinctions are learned before lower 
distinctions. C. Only deep networks exhibit quasi-stage-like transitions in learning, which arise from 
saddle points in the error surface. D. For a class of hierarchies, learning speed is a decreasing function 
of hierarchy level, and the network will exhibit progressive differentiation. E. Deep but not shallow 
networks can make transient errors on specific items and properties during learning. F. Internal neural 
representational similarity reliably mirrors behavioural similarity in networks trained from small weights. 
Networks trained from large weights exhibit correct behaviour but idiosyncratic neural representations. 
[A-F: REF 65]. G. This dependence on initialization can be understood through a transition in learning 
dynamics between a “feature learning” regime and a “lazy learning” regime [REF 64]. 
 
Recently, this approach has been applied to the study of semantic cognition (Fig. 3).65. During 
development, children transition through discrete stages in which they rapidly acquire new 
categories or concepts. Their learning is also highly structured: for example, semantic 
knowledge is progressively differentiated, as children pick up on broader hierarchical 
distinctions (animal vs. plant) before finer distinctions (rose vs. daisy) and display stereotyped 
errors, such as thinking that worms have bones75. Deep networks trained on richly structured 
data are known to exhibit these phenomena76, but only recently has it been shown that stage-
like transitions arise due to saddle points in the error surface, progressive differentiation from 
the way the singular values of the input-output correlations drive learning over time, and 
semantic illusions from pressure to sacrifice accuracy on exceptions to meet the global 
supervised objective65. Moreover, it can be shown that these phenomena are an inevitable 
consequence of depth itself, arising in deep linear networks but not shallow networks even 
though the two classes of model converge to identical terminal solutions. This highlights the 
importance for neuroscientists of studying learning dynamics, i.e. the trajectory that learning 
takes, rather than simply examining representations in networks that have converged. 
One potential concern is that insights acquired in this way might not scale, because models are 
idealisations that eschew the messy complexity of state-of-the art deep networks and make 
assumptions that are false for biology (e.g. linear transduction or layers of infinite width). 
However, we argue that neural theory is well served by analytic formulations of complex 
phenomena that give rise to specific, falsifiable predictions for neural circuits and systems. We 
hope that neuroscientists will incorporate reductions of deep network models into their 
canonical set of neural theories, rather than blindly seeking correspondences between brains 
and fully-fledged deep learning systems that offer little hope of being understood. 
7. Learning rules for sensory systems  
Research using idealized neural networks offers the hope that we can understand how learning 
occurs in biological brains. But specifically, what research questions should we ask? What 
empirical phenomena might deep networks predict that conventional models from classical 
neuroscience might not? 
Psychologists and neuroscientists have traditionally debated the extent to which perceptual 
representations are prespecified by evolution or learned via experience77. For example, it 
remains controversial whether primate face representations are innate or acquired78,79. The 
deep learning framework reframes this debate by asking how neural codes emerge from 
different learning principles. One strong candidate is supervised learning with gradient 
descent, in which representations are sculpted by feedback about the label, name or category 
associated with a sensory input29. Thus far, supervised models have been the major focus of 
comparisons between deep networks and biology29. However, a long tradition in neuroscience 
emphasizes unsupervised principles such as Hebbian learning, or argues that representations 
are formed by a pressure to accurately predict the spatially or temporally local environment 
under an efficiency constraint80-82. Indeed, recent deep generative models show a remarkable 
ability to disentangle complex, high-dimensional signals into their latent factors under this self-
supervised objective83,84. Finally, a successful AI model that has yet to impact neuroscience 
proposes instead that representation formation is driven by the need to accurately predict the 
motivational value of experience4.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One way to evaluate these schemes is to compare their ability to furnish deep networks with 
rich representations and complex behaviours when exposed to naturalistic data. To date, most 
successful candidates use some form of gradient descent. However, standard supervised 
models, such as those popular for explaining primate object recognition, seem to require 
improbable quantities of labelled data – unlike human infants, who gain sophisticated object 
understanding even before language is acquired. Another challenge for networks trained with 
gradient descent is the problem of assigning credit among parameters. Deep networks cascade 
Figure 4. Testing principles of learning using perceptual learning paradigms. A. A simple deep network 
model of perceptual learning. Clockwise or counter clockwise oriented visual inputs flow through two 
layers of weights to an output layer that reports direction of rotation. Initially, the input layer weights 
have bell-curve tuning to orientation and the output layer weights are untuned. B. Schematic of tuning 
curve slope changes due to gradient descent learning in the model (left) and primate V1 (right). C. 
Schematic of total synaptic change in input weights and output weights over training. The higher layer 
changes more. D. Schematic of behavioural performance transfer to an untrained retinal location over 
learning. Early learning transfers well but late learning is retinotopically specific. E. A schematized 
conceptual space of learning rules, in which specific learning rules are points. Experimental observations 
may be consistent with regions of this space (coloured circles) containing several learning rules. 
Intersecting many constraints can begin to narrow the set of candidate learning algorithms. F. Schematic 
predictions of gradient descent—for which the most informative neurons change most—and correlation 
Hebbian learning, for which the most active neurons change most. G. Schematic predictions of 
contrastive Hebbian learning, for which higher layers change more than lower, and a predictive coding 
scheme for which lower layers change more than higher.  
 
simple operations across layers to permit complex input-output transformations, for example 
learning a hierarchy of detectors for object edges, parts and wholes in successive layers. Whilst 
this divide-and-conquer strategy maximizes representational power, it demands that a change 
at one synapse accounts for how this adjustment will propagate through the rest of the 
network. A grand challenge for neuroscience is to test whether learning in the brain can in fact 
assign credit across the neural hierarchy, and if so, to identify a biologically realistic 
implementation, i.e. one where updates are local, and forward and backward connectivity in 
the network is not required to be symmetric. While credit assignment was once thought to be 
biologically implausible, we now have a growing set of candidate implementations in need of 
empirical tests85,86. 
Learning principles also make divergent predictions about how representations should emerge 
or change during prolonged training. This opens the door to studies of perceptual learning that 
can attempt to confirm or refute these predictions87. For example, Fig. 4 shows the predictions 
of a neural network model trained to classify tilted gratings with gradient descent, under the 
assumption that input-layer units have initially bell-shaped tuning curves66. Extant neural and 
behavioural phenomena emerge seamlessly from the model, such as stronger sharpening of 
the tuning functions of the most informative neurons, earlier and stronger representational 
changes in higher cortical stages (i.e. deeper layers) during training, greater proneness to 
transfer of coarse than fine discrimination tasks across space to new retinal locations, and 
transfer of fine discrimination tasks early but not late during training. These phenomena, which 
are characterized mathematically in deep linear networks, also occur in the nonlinear case66,87. 
Critically, other learning principles make qualitatively different predictions (Fig. 4E-G). For 
example, under correlational Hebbian learning, the most active (rather than most informative) 
neurons change the most. Contrastive Hebbian learning causes the higher layer to change far 
more than the lower layer, whereas the converse is true for a predictive-coding scheme with 
top-down negative feedback. Whilst these constraints do not pin down the exact algorithm at 
work in perceptual learning, they offer collective evidence about the learning principles likely 
to be at work in biology. More generally, this approach opens the door to a new programme 
of experiments in which principles of learning are interrogated by measuring the dynamics of 
representational change across cortical stages using macroscopic imaging techniques such as 
fMRI or wide-field calcium imaging. 
8. Deep learning principles for cognition  
Deep neural networks excel at classifying complex inputs into distinct classes like objects or 
words. Equally important, however, is what comes next: we link objects and items into diverse 
knowledge structures that describe our world. We know, for instance, that a dog can bark and 
that a maple is a type of tree. Moreover, we form semantic categories from multimodal 
features, connecting the written and spoken name for an object with its shape, odour, and 
texture. This conceptual knowledge of the world transcends physical appearance, interlinking 
diverse and even unobservable object properties (for instance, that a dog has a spleen). The 
abstractions we acquire over the course of development form the building blocks for flexible 
generalization and higher-level cognition in maturity88.  
Evaluating deep learning insights beyond the realm of perceptual tasks is a key open 
opportunity for neuroscientists. The behaviour of humans and other animals is governed by a 
rich array of cognitive functions, including modular memory processes, attentional and task-
level control, and neural systems for navigation, planning, mental simulation, reasoning, and 
abstract inference. These cognitive functions are implemented in a regionally specialised brain, 
in which a patchwork of subcortical and allocortical structures interconnects with both 
granular and infragranular cortical zones, each housing unique cell types and circuits. If we are 
committed to deploying deep learning models as theories for biology, then we need to take 
seriously the question of how such elaborate structure in cognition and behaviour emerges 
from end-to-end optimization. How do humans learn abstract representations, divorced from 
physical object properties? How do we assemble knowledge into relational structures like 
trees, rings, and grids? How do we compose new behaviours from existing subcomponents? 
How do we rapidly acquire and generalise new memories? These are important questions for 
AI researchers as well, and indeed, some have expressed a hope that machine learning will 
soon offer more powerful models in which higher cognitive functions emerge naturally via a 
“blind search” process, allowing neuroscientists to sidestep the problem32. Indeed, recent 
advances in AI research have followed the successful fusion of deep learning with other 
methods, such as reinforcement learning4, context-addressable memory89,90, or Monte-Carlo 
tree search5,91, demonstrating a proof of concept for end-to-end learning in complex cognitive 
architectures. However, we argue that a more fruitful research agenda for neuroscientists 
builds off the work of past decades, in which researchers have experimentally dissected 
cognitive systems, in many cases providing a detailed, computationally grounded account of 
their function. For example, we understand a great deal about the navigation system in the 
rodent medial temporal lobe92, the motor system in song birds93, or the saccadic system in the 
macaque monkey94. We argue for a research programme that embraces the deep learning 
framework but seeks to address concrete questions about theory and implementation that are 
recognisable to neuroscientists and cognitive scientists. 
9. Abstraction and generalisation 
 
Deep networks excel when data is abundant, and training is exhaustive. However, they struggle 
to extrapolate this knowledge to new environments populated by previously unseen features 
and objects. Humans, by contrast, seem to generalise effectively28. For example, most people 
can navigate a foreign city where the language, coinage and customs are unfamiliar, because 
they understand concepts such as greeting, taxi and map. A popular view is that deep networks 
fail to transfer because they do not form neural codes that abstract over physically dissimilar 
domains. Building deep networks that can generalise in this way would be a major milestone 
for machine learning. This provides an incentive for neuroscientists to study how biological 
brains encode, compose and generalise abstract knowledge95-97. 
 
Unfortunately, key methodological challenges arise for neuroscientists seeking to address this 
question. Firstly, it is unknown whether experimental animals such as rodents and macaques 
(or even our closer primate cousins98) have evolved neural mechanisms that permit the strong, 
flexible transfer of knowledge that characterise human intelligence. It is thus unclear whether 
invasive tools for recording and interference (such as electrophysiology or optogenetics) can 
be used to study generalisation and transfer in animals. To study human abstraction, we are 
obliged to use macroscopic imaging methods such as fMRI, MEG and EEG, that are less well 
suited to revealing how computation unfolds in neural circuits. Nevertheless, inventive new 
ways of using these tools are being developed, allowing researchers to probe replay99-101, 
changes in excitatory-inhibitory balance102,103, or hexagonal (grid) coding104,105 in human brain 
signals. Secondly, humans (and other animals) usually enter the laboratory with rich past 
experiences that sculpt the ways that they learn. This complicates direct comparisons between 
humans and neural networks, because it is difficult to imbue artificial systems with equivalent 
priors, or to eliminate human priors using wholly novel stimuli. Thirdly, humans and neural 
networks learn over very different timescales. For example, deep reinforcement learning 
systems exceed human performance on Atari video games, but require many times more 
training than a human player106. 
 
In an end-to-end learning system, abstract representations need to be grounded in experience. 
One possibility is that lifelong exposure to huge volumes of sensory data might allow strong 
invariances to emerge naturally via either supervised or unsupervised learning. In the medial 
temporal lobe (MTL), which sits at the apex of the primate ventral stream, there is evidence 
that cells develop physically invariant coding properties. For example, in humans, ‘concept’ 
cells code for famous individuals or landmarks, irrespective of whether they are denoted by 
pictures or words107.  Echoes of this coding scheme can be seen in other animals, where MTL 
coding is tied more tightly to allocentric space. For example, hippocampal place cells code for 
locations in a way that is invariant to the viewpoint and heading direction108, and in primates, 
‘schema’ cells remap between environments in a way that allows for generalisation over 
common spatial configurations109. These neural codes for high-level concepts can form when 
different features, objects or locations are repeatedly associated in space or time, for example 
via Hebbian learning110. Indeed, fMRI studies of statistical learning have revealed that neural 
similarities (e.g. multivoxel pattern overlap) in the MTL recapitulate association strengths for 
pairs, lines, maps or hierarchies of stimuli111-118. Moreover, in an bandit task, the entorhinal 
cortex is one brain region where a consistent mapping exists between neural patterns and the 
covariance among stimuli and rewards, irrespective of the physical images involved119. 
Stitching together multiple patterns of association, and learning their structure, could allow 
animals to learn a comprehensive model of the world that can be used for navigation, inference 
and planning120. 
 
In parallel with this growing emphasis on the virtues of model-based computation in 
neuroscience, machine learning researchers are building powerful deep generative models 
that are capable of disentangling the world into its latent factors, and recomposing these to 
construct realistic synthetic images in 3D84,121,122. However, to date, wiring these generative 
models up with control systems to build intelligent agents has proved challenging, despite 
some promising efforts90. Indeed, AI researchers have struggled to build model-based systems 
that can hold their own against model-free agents in benchmark problems such as Atari123. It 
is paradoxical that this is occurring against a rich backdrop of neuroscience research that 
emphasises the virtues of model-based inference. In fact, neuroscientists have even begun to 
unravel how seemingly idiosyncratic coding properties in the MTL and other structures may be 
hallmarks of a normative scheme for computational efficient planning and inference124,125. For 
example, grid cell codes in the medial entorhinal cortex and elsewhere may be signatures of a 
neural code that has learned the geometry by which space itself is structured, potentially 
supporting transfer learning for navigation125. There are even hints that this coding scheme 
may apply to nonspatial as well as spatial domains105, potentially laying the foundations for a 
theory of higher-order human reasoning126. Although machine learning researchers have 
noted that lattice-like codes may emerge when deep RL systems are trained to navigate127,128, 
they have yet to build on these insights for building stronger AI. More generally, understanding 
how to simulate biologically plausible model-based computations in a way that is useful to 
machine learning researchers is a potentially rich intellectual seam that neuroscientists are 
only just beginning to exploit. 
 
10. Neural resource allocation during task learning 
 
Humans and other animals continue to learn across their lifespan. This “continual” learning 
might allow a human to acquire a second language, a monkey to adopt a new social role, or a 
rodent to navigate in a novel environment. This is in stark contrast to most current AI systems, 
that lack the flexibility to acquire new behaviours once they have achieved convergence on an 
initial task. Building machines that can learn continually, like humans and other animals, is 
proving one of the thorniest challenges in contemporary machine learning research129. 
Fortunately, however, this question has opened up new avenues for neuroscience research 
focussed on how biology may have solved continual learning8,130.  
 
It has long been noted that in neural networks, learning pursuant to an initial task A is often 
overwritten during subsequent training on task B (“catastrophic interference”)131. This occurs 
because a parameterisation that solves task A is not guaranteed to solve any other task, and 
so during training on task B, gradient descent drives network weights away from the local 
minimum for task A. It occurs even when the network has sufficient capacity to perform both 
tasks, because simultaneous (or “interleaved”) training allows the discovery of a setting that 
jointly solves tasks A and B. In humans, new learning can sometimes degrade extant 
performance, for example when memorising associate pairs A-C after having encoded pairs A-
B, but in general interference effects are far less dramatic than for neural networks132. 
 
One popular model suggests that mammals have evolved to solve continual learning by using 
complementary learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex130,133,134.   Unlike the 
cortex, hippocampus can rapidly learn sparse (or “pattern-separated”) representations of 
specific experiences, often called “episodic” memories135, and these memories are replayed 
offline during periods of rest or sleep136. Hippocampal replay provides an opportunity for 
virtual interleaving of past and present experience, potentially allowing memories to be 
gradually consolidated into neocortical circuits in a way that circumvents the problem of 
catastrophic interference. This theory is supported by a wealth of evidence, including the 
finding that hippocampal damage leads to a gradient of retrograde amnesia137, and reports of 
double dissociations between instance-based memory (or “recollection”) in the hippocampus 
and summaries of past experience (or “familiarity”) in neocortex138. In more recent years 
artificial replay of past experiences has emerged as a critical factor that allows deep networks 
to exhibit strong performance in temporally correlated environments139, including deep 
reinforcement learning agents for dynamic video games4. Pleasingly, this has allowed theorists 
to draw a link between computational solutions to continual learning in biological and artificial 
intelligence140. Adaptations of the CLS framework allow it to account for seemingly 
contradictory phenomena, such as the involvement of medial temporal lobe structures in rapid 
statistical learning130.  
 
Whilst evidence grows that offline replay may be important for memory consolidation, the 
problem of continual learning has provoked new questions for neuroscientists. Is biological 
learning actively partitioned so as to avoid catastrophic interference? Unlike neural networks, 
animals do not always benefit from interleaved study conditions (imagine learning the violin 
and the cello at once). For example, humans who have been trained in a blocked fashion to 
classify naturalistic stimuli (trees) according to two orthogonal boundaries (their “leafiness” vs. 
“branchiness”) perform better on a later interleaved test (compared to those who experienced 
the same conditions at training and test)8. Other evidence from human category learning 
implies that human knowledge may be actively partitioned by time and context141,142. Indeed, 
promising solutions to continual learning in the machine learning literature rely on the 
identification of weight subspaces where new learning is least likely to cause retrospective 
interference, for example by “freezing” synapses that are more likely to participate  in extant 
tasks143,144. These tools are more effective when coupled with a gating process that overtly 
earmarks neural subspaces for new learning, in a way that resembles top-down attention in 
the primate neocortex145,146. Another intriguing possibility is that unsupervised processes 
facilitate continual learning in biological systems by clustering neural representations 
according to their context. Hebbian learning might encourage the formation of orthogonal 
neural codes for different temporally contexts147, which in turn allows tasks to be learned in 
different neural subspaces146. The curious phenomenon of “representational drift” (where 
neural codes meander unpredictably over time)148 might reflect the allocation of information 
to different neural circuits in distinct contexts, allowing for task knowledge to be partitioned 
in a way that minimises interference149. 
 
A more general question is how biological systems have evolved both to minimise negative 
transfer (interference) and maximise positive transfer (generalisation) among tasks. One 
fascinating theoretical perspective argues that the capacity limits inherent in biological control 
processes are a response to this conundrum150. Using simulations involving deep networks, the 
authors show that shared and separate task representations have mixed costs and benefits, 
with shared codes allowing for generalisation between tasks at this risk of interference 
between tasks. They suggest that the brain has found a solution by promoting shared neural 
codes, which in turns allows for strong transfer, but deploying control processes to gate out 
irrelevant tasks that might provoke interference. They suggest that this answers the question 
of why, despite a brain that comprises billions of neurons and trillions of connections, humans 
struggle with multi-tasking problems such typing a line of computer code whilst answering a 
question150.  
 
11. Conclusions 
 
Deep learning models have much to offer neuroscience. Most exciting is the potential to go 
beyond handcrafting of function, and to understand how computation emerges from 
experience. Neuroscientists have recognised this opportunity, but its exploitation has only just 
begun. In this Perspective, we have tried to offer a roadmap for researchers wishing to use 
deep networks as neural theories. Our principal exhortation for neuroscientists is to use deep 
networks as predictive models that make falsifiable predictions, and to use model idealisation 
methods to provide genuine understanding of how and why they might capture biological 
phenomena. We caution against using increasingly complex models and simulations which 
outpace our conceptual insight and discourage the blind search for correspondences in neural 
codes formed by biological and artificial systems. Instead, we hope that neuroscientists will 
build models that explain human behaviour, learning dynamics and neural coding in rich and 
fruitful ways, but without losing the interpretability inherent to classical neural models. 
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